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Abstract
People may engage in protest activity either because of collective incentives or selective 
incentives, or a combination of them. In this study we focus on the selective incentives part 
of the calculus of political participation, particularly the impact of the social dimension. 
We hypothesize that people will participate in demonstrations or other forms of protest, 
to a higher extent if they are afraid of rejection, but only if they feel that they have high 
social support for their own position. This hypothesis was supported in an online survey 
experiment where social support was manipulated. Results also revealed that individuals 
who were highly rejection sensitive were among the most likely to participate even though 
they did not believe protest activity to be an efficient way to bring about social change. 
This supports the notion that some individuals tend to engage in protest activity for 
purely social reasons. However it is still unclear whether these individuals are driven 
by an approach motivation to establish new social bonds or an avoidance motivation to 
escape possible social rejection.
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P
olitical protest in 2011 was such a widespread phenomenon around the globe that 
the magazine Time chose the ‘Protester’ as the ‘Person of the Year’. Movements 
such as the Spanish ‘Indignados’, the Greek ‘Aganaktismeni’, or the American ‘Occupy 
Wall Street’ mobilized several million people to take the streets and expanded to many 
other Western democracies.  But, why do people leave their homes and participate in 
such demonstrations? In the scientific literature, protest activity has been framed as 
a collective action problem (Opp, 2009), and Olsen (1965) describes participation as a 
costly act. Since the probability of deciding the outcome is low, rational citizens should 
abstain from participating in political activities. Yet, many citizens become active. The 
aim of this paper is to contribute to explaining why individuals protest.
Several solutions to this ‘paradox’ have been presented. We focus on solutions 
centering on selective incentives, benefits that accrue to those who participate and are 
enjoyed independently of the political outcome (Bäck, Teorell, & Westholm, 2011). 
Specifically, we are interested in incentives relating to the social groups that individuals 
belong to. Several authors have stressed the role of social incentives, mainly focusing on 
the idea that integration into social networks encouraging protest is an important factor 
for engaging in protest behavior (Opp, 2009). For instance, one important explanation 
of participation is membership in the specific group being affected by some grievance 
(Klandermans, 2011). 
Because people have a fundamental need to belong to groups (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995), they are also sensitive to rejection cues (Williams, 2007). To some extent, engaging 
in protest activities may be driven by a fear of otherwise being rejected. Individuals vary 
in how sensitive they are to rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Even though there 
is some research on the link between personality and political participation (Caprara, 
2008), this particular personality characteristic has been surprisingly absent from 
research on collective action and protest activity. We believe that individuals who are 
sensitive to rejection will take part in protest activity to a larger extent than those who 
are less sensitive. However, this should only be true when the individual has high social 
support for their own preference, and thus will not risk being rejected from the own 
group. 
Participation, Incentives, and Rejection Sensitivity
The ‘paradox’ of participation
Our theoretical starting point derives from the rational choice literature on political 
participation where participation is described as a costly act, an attempt to bring about a 
public good available to everybody (Olson, 1965). Individual's impact on the probability 
of deciding the collective outcome is low, thus rational citizens should abstain from 
participating in political activity. Yet, many citizens become active, for example in 
demonstrations or other forms of protest. Two models have been proposed to explain this 
'paradox'. First, the collective incentives model, which suggests that some citizens believe 
they can influence political outcomes. Research here has focused on the fact that some 
individuals have a high sense of ‘efficacy’. Second, the selective incentives model focuses 
on the benefits that accrue to those who participate and are enjoyed independently of the 
political outcome (Bäck et al., 2011).
In this paper, we focus on the so-called selective incentives. Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) suggest that the original calculus of voting is incomplete, because it ignores the 3
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rewards of the act of voting that are independent of the outcome. These authors therefore 
stress the importance of psychic gratifications, such as the positive experience of having 
done one’s duty when voting (cf. Bäck et al., 2011). Another type of selective incentive 
is known as expressive incentives. This is illustrated by supporters who root for their 
favorite sports team in front of the TV even though the team can neither hear nor see 
their efforts. Thus, the purpose of cheering is not to promote victory but to enjoy the 
satisfaction of expression per se (Brennan & Lomasky, 1985). Moreover, according to 
Whiteley (1995, p. 222), ‘ideological radicalism should motivate party members to become 
more involved than voters or inactive members, if the reward for their involvement is to 
express deeply held beliefs in company with other like-minded individuals’. This type of 
incentive can be generalized to other forms of political action, such as protest activity, 
that gives citizens an opportunity to express intense political opinions. Further, political 
participation may have entertainment value (Tullock, 1971). Citizens who vote, campaign, 
lobby or demonstrate may find the activity exciting per se or enjoy the company of other 
participants (Bäck et al., 2011).
In this article we focus on these forms of incentives. We contend that participants 
of protest events, such as demonstrations, derive some benefits from participation per se 
(Pattie et al, 2004, p. 142). More specifically, we are interested in incentives that relate to 
the social groups that individuals belong to or aspire to become part of, what can broadly 
be labeled as ‘social incentives’. The role of social incentives in political participation is   
further discussed below.
The role of social incentives in participation
Several authors have stressed the role of social incentives in political participation.   
The main idea is that integration into social networks is an important reason for engaging 
in protest behavior and may encourage protest (Opp, 2009). Indeed, it has consistently 
been shown that one important reason why people participate is that they belong to the 
specific group being affected by some grievance (Klandermans, 2011). 
In particular, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that individuals 
have a strong motivation to seek out groups where they are accepted and respected. Such 
memberships fulfills several basic needs, such as the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995), to feel unique (Brewer, 1991; 2007), to maintain or increase self-esteem (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), and to reduce uncertainty by validating others (Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 
2008). Thus, humans are motivated to seek the support of others. Such social support 
has previously been presented as one explanation as to why individuals participate in 
collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004). The idea is that if an individual receives 
information that others share their opinions, then he/she can define the situation as 
collective, which implies that others should also be willing to take action (van Zomeren et 
al., 2004; Klandermans, 1997). For instance, Mackie et al. (2000) showed that perceiving 
that one’s beliefs are shared, explained both anger and intention to engage in action 
against an opposing out-group. Social support also indicate that participation is ‘safe’ in 
the sense that the individual will not be subjected to criticism or questioning, at least not 
from his/her own group, which should be more important than risk being questioned by 
other groups to which the individual does not belong (Otten, 2002). 
The fundamental need to belong also implies sensitivity to rejection cues (Williams, 
2007). To some extent engaging in protest activities on behalf of the group may be driven 
by a fear of otherwise being rejected or sanctioned. Moreover, individuals may differ in 4
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how sensitive they are to rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). We therefore believe that 
it is not only important to take into account whether individuals belong to or identify 
with certain social groups, but that certain personality characteristics should matter for 
protest activity. 
When it comes to personality and political participation, the literature in general 
is relatively silent. However, researchers like Caprara and colleagues (Caprara, 2008; 
Caprara, Vecchione & Schwartz, 2012), have focused on such features, showing that 
personality characteristics and personal values affect political participation (focusing on 
turnout in elections). In a similar vein, Mondak (2010) showed that highly conscientious 
individuals (as defined by the Big Five) participate in politics to a higher extent when 
they perceive that the political system will be responsive to their actions. In keeping 
with this line of literature, we believe that another feature which might be linked to 
participation in collective action is rejection sensitivity.  
Rejection sensitivity has been defined as a disposition to anxiously expect, readily 
perceive, and intensely react to rejection (Downey, Khouri, & Feldman, 1997; Berenson 
et al., 2009). Variations along this trait explain why some individuals are more vulnerable 
to experiences of rejection than others (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Individuals who are 
sensitive to rejection have usually experienced rejection from close others previously and 
thus have learnt to expect rejection in different situations. These expectations motivate 
them to protect themselves against future rejection (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & 
Khouri, 1998). 
Even though rejection sensitivity has mostly been studied in interpersonal settings, 
it should be relevant on a higher, group level as well. For instance, a highly rejection 
sensitive female should be more attentive to rejection cues and connect them to gender 
based discrimination, at least when gender is salient. Indeed, recent research indicates 
that such an application of rejection sensitivity is warranted. Romero-Canyas et al (2010) 
show that individuals who are high in rejection sensitivity conform more to their groups, 
when their identity is threatened. 
This application of rejection sensitivity to group based attributes is quite novel. 
In this paper, we present the novel idea that highly rejection sensitive individuals may 
engage more in certain protest activities, as conforming to group standards is one way to 
protect oneself against rejection.
 
Rejection sensitivity
We suggest that if an individual perceives cues of rejection from the group, it is 
possible he/she may engage more in group serving behaviors. A situation where rejection 
is likely may be when the group to which an individual belong is about to take collective 
action. To not engage in the action and support one’s fellow group members may be seen 
by the other members as an act of betrayal which could lead to possible rejection. Thus, in 
order to withstand such a threat, individual members may engage in participation, at least 
to some extent, due to their fear of rejection. In such a scenario, individual differences 
in sensitivity to rejection might play an important role and may affect tendencies to 
engage in collective action. To our knowledge, no research has so far investigated the 
link between rejection sensitivity and willingness to participate in protests. 
As mentioned above, under some circumstances rejection sensitivity seems to 
moderate the effect of identity threat (Romero-Canyas et al., 2010). Specifically, highly 
rejection sensitivity individuals conform more to their group (Romero-Canyas et al., 
2010). It is thus plausible that high sensitivity to rejection may elicit willingness to engage 
in group-serving behaviors in general, and also protest participation. 5
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We contend that individuals who are sensitive to rejection are more likely to take part 
in protest activity than those who are less sensitive to rejection. This should particularly 
be true when participation is ‘safe’, that is, when there is no obvious risk of being 
questioned or criticized for participation, for example, when informed that most others 
agree with the individual. Thus, we suggest that there is a conditional impact of rejection 
sensitivity and social support on collective action, which has not been investigated before. 
Some selective incentives should matter more for certain individuals. Individuals who 
are sensitive to rejection are more likely to be influenced by whether their own opinion 
is also supported by others participating in collective action.
To clarify our theoretical argument, we refer to the calculus of participation, which 
suggests that selective incentives should matter and may induce participation even when 
collective benefits are low. Such selective incentives may for example include expressive 
incentives, suggesting that individuals derive an expressive value from protest activity 
since it gives them a chance to voice their opinions in the company of likeminded people.
Selective incentives to protest activity also include social norms, which tell the individual 
that it is appropriate to take part in such activity. 
We suggest that the calculus  should also take other contextual features into account 
(here, social support), and certain personality features (here, rejection sensitivity). More 
specifically, we argue that selective incentives, such as expressive incentives and social 
norms, should only have a positive effect on protest activity under certain circumstances: 
(1) when social support for the own opinion is high (this is when the individual would 
expect to join ‘likeminded’ people in a protest, and when they believe that there is a 
social norm saying that they should take part in a particular cause), and (2) when we 
are dealing with individuals who are highly sensitive to rejection. We thus formulate the 
hypothesis:
H: Individuals are more likely to take part in protest activity when they are highly 
rejection sensitive and when social support for their own opinion is high. 
Methods 
Participants and Material
To perform a first evaluation of the hypothesis that we should see more protest 
activity among individuals who are highly rejection sensitive when social support for 
their own opinion is high, we have performed a survey experiment. The participants of 
this study were 40 university students (29 women; Mage= 25.5, SD = 5.68). Participants 
were recruited from a web site for people interested in participating in scientific studies. 
The web questionnaire took about 15 minutes to complete. As compensation they were 
entered in a lottery where they had the possibility to win gift certificates worth 500 
SEK, 250 SEK and 100 SEK (about £50, £25 and £10 respectively). All participants were 
notified by e-mail if they had won or not. The experimental manipulation consisted of 
whether the participant received high or low social support for his/her opinion. 
The web questionnaire was introduced as a study on attitudes towards higher 
education in Sweden. On the first page, participants were informed about anonymity 
and that by starting the questionnaire they gave informed consent to participation. 
First, participants read a fake newspaper article discussing a new proposal to implement 
tuition fees at Swedish universities and colleges. To make the article credible, we used 6
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the design of a well-known and respected Swedish newspaper. 
The article was designed to manipulate social support for the participant’s own 
preference. Pre-testing of the choice of issue revealed that most students, 95% of 
participants (n = 59) in the pre-study opposed tuition fees1. Further, on this particular 
issue, university students have very strong opinions (M = 5.76, SD = 1.39), and the issue 
is considered important (M = 5.63, SD = 1.35) on 7-point scales from 1 = Not at all strong/
Not at all important to 7 = Very strong/Very important. Thus, we could be confident that 
most students would oppose the proposal to implement tuition fees. 
This made it possible to manipulate social support in the newspaper article by creating 
one article that was very positive towards tuition fees and one that was very negative.  In 
the positive version, henceforth called the ‘low social support’ version, the general tone 
was that the proposal to implement tuition fees was positive, that most political parties, 
known University professors, and the National Student Union supported the proposal. 
In the negative version, henceforth called the ‘high social support’ version, the proposal 
was presented as the opposite. Half of the participants received the low social support 
version and half received the high social support version. Participants were assigned 
randomly to conditions. 
Measures
Position on the issue. After reading the article, participants stated their own position 
on the issue (pro/con tuition fees). This item read ‘Think about your opinion on this 
issue for a while. If you were to take a position on the proposal to implement tuition fees, 
what alternative would you choose?’. Answers were dichotomous, ‘I am in favor of the 
implementation of tuition fees’, and ‘I am against the implementation of tuition fees’. 
Normative endorsement. Participants also stated how important they considered the 
issue to be, how strong their opinion was, and how certain they were on their position. 
Answers were measured on 7-point scales from 1 = Not at all important/Not at all strong/
not at all certain to 7 = Very important/Very strong/very certain. 
Collective action tendencies. This was followed by measures of collective action 
tendencies (i.e., our dependent variable; cf. van Zomeren et al., 2008). The question 
read ‘Sometimes people feel so strongly about something that they are prepared to take 
action to stop or enforce it. Considering the proposal to implement tuition fees, what 
would you consider doing to get your point across?’. Here, participants were given two 
items previously used by van Zomeren and colleagues (2008): ‘I would participate in a 
demonstration’, and ‘I would sign a petition’. Answers ranged on 7 point-scales from 1 = 
Not at all likely to 7 = Very likely. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.70, indicating good reliability.   
The items were collapsed into one index of collective action tendencies (M = 5.38, SD = 
1.62).  
Mode-specific efficacy. After this, we measured mode-specific efficacy, that is, how 
efficient the participant perceive different modes of participation to be in order to bring 
about change. On a 10-point scale from 1 = not at all efficient to 10 = highly efficient 
participants rated the efficiency on voting, working in a political party, personally 
contacting politicians that have influence, participating in public demonstrations and 
signing petitions. The items for demonstrating and signing petitions were collapsed into 
1  This pre-test was part of a bachelor thesis on the topic of tuition fees. It was a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire handed to students in basic level psychology courses at Södertörn University College in 
Stockholm.7
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one index of Efficacy (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94; M = 6.07, SD = 2.10)
Rejection sensitivity. Rejection sensitivity was measured using the short version of the 
rejection sensitivity scale (8 items; cf. Downey & Feldman, 1996). Participants were asked 
to imagine themselves in different situations that describe things that people sometimes 
ask of others, for example ‘You ask your parents or another family member for a loan 
to help you through a difficult financial time’. For each situation, participants rate a) 
how concerned or anxious they would be over the others’ reactions, for example ‘How 
concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your family would want to help 
you’ (1 = very unconcerned to 6 = very concerned), and b) to what extent they expect the 
others to help them in this situation, for example ‘I would expect that they would agree 
to help as much as they can’  (1 = very unlikely to 6 = very likely). A total of 8 similar 
scenarios were presented to the participants. To calculate a score of rejection sensitivity 
for each situation, the level of rejection concern (response to question a) is multiplied by 
the reverse of the level of acceptance expectancy (response to question b). An index of 
overall rejection sensitivity is then calculated by taking the mean of all scores for each 
situation (Berenson, et al., 2009).  Mean rejection sensitivity score M = 8.36 with a SD = 
3.86, which is fairly close to the population scores (M = 9.69, SD = 3.07, see Berenson et 
al., 2009).
Identification. Finally, we measured social identification with the student union (the 
social movement organization, see Klandermans, 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
We chose to measure identification with the student union rather than just social 
identification with the group ‘students’ because research shows that social movement 
organization identification is a better predictor of collective action participation 
(Klandermans, 2011). This identification measure was included as a control variable. 
Because this variable typically is a very good predictor of protest activity, we wanted to 
test whether rejection sensitivity predicts collective action tendencies over and beyond 
the effect of identification. Identification was measured with the following four items: 
‘I see myself as part of the student union’, ‘I identify with the student union’, ‘I feel 
connected to the student union’, and ‘I am happy to be a part of the student union’.  All 
answers ranged on 7-point scales from 1 = Do not agree at all, to 7 = Completely agree. 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.97, again indicating very high internal consistency between 
items (M = 3.26, SD = 1.91).
Results and Discussion
Analyses confirmed that most participants (95%) opposed tuition fees. Two 
participants supported the proposal and were thus removed from further analyses, 
resulting in a total of 38 cases. The ratings for importance, opinion strength, and 
certainty were again high (Ms = 6.00, 6.21, and 6.21, respectively and SDs = 1.54, 1.04, 
and 0.96, respectively for the three items). This confirmed that our choice of issue was 
appropriate given the previous results from the pre-study, and that our manipulation of 
social support was effective.
To test our hypothesis, a linear, hierarchical regression analysis was performed. In 
the first step (Model 1) social identity, rejection sensitivity and social support (dummy-
coded using low support as reference category) were entered. The two-way interaction 
between support for own position (high/low) and rejection sensitivity was entered in the 
second model (step 2). The results showed that none of the predictors was significant 
in the first model, as can be seen in Table 1. In keeping with previous literature (e.g., 8
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Klandermans, 2011), there was a non-significant trend in the expected direction for 
identification, such that increased identification with the student union increased the 
motivation to participate in protest activity.
In the second model there was a significant interaction between social support and 
rejection sensitivity. Results showed that highly rejection sensitive individuals were more 
likely to participate than low rejection sensitive people if they had high social support, 
but not if they had low social support, giving clear support to our hypothesis. This is 
more clearly illustrated in Figure 1, where the conditional effect of rejection sensitivity 
and social support on collective action tendencies is described. Tests of the contrast of 
marginal effects confirmed the statistically significant differences in the slopes for each 
group at p < 0.005.
Thus, these results show that individuals who are afraid of rejection (high RS), but 
feel that most others share their own position, that is experience high social support, 
are more likely to participate than those who are either low in rejection sensitivity 
or do not feel social support for their own opinion. A possible interpretation of this 
result is that participation could be interpreted as a way to build social connections. 
These individuals scored highest on willingness to participate. Second, most likely to 
participate were individuals who scored low on the rejection sensitivity measure and 
low on social support. One interpretation of this specific result is that for those who are 
not afraid of rejection (low RS), collective incentives are more important in determining 
participation in protest activity; they participate when they feel that activity is needed, 
that is when support for their opinion is low, as opposed to high. 
In order to investigate this idea we performed further analyses adding efficacy to 
the model. Indeed, another important aspect which might influence whether people 
will participate or not is the extent to which they believe that the particular form of 
political influence is effective (Bandura, 1995; 1997; van Zomeren, 2004). If people do 
not believe that protest activity is an effective way to bring about social change, then they 
will be less motivated to take part in such actions (i.e. collective incentives are expected 
to be low). The regression analysis used previously was modified adding efficacy as a 
single predictor in model 1, and the two-way interactions between efficacy and support, 
and efficacy and rejection sensitivity in model 2, as well as the three-way interaction 
between support, rejection sensitivity and efficacy in the third model while controlling 
for identification with the student union. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 1. Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Social Support, Rejection Sensitivity, and Social Identity 
on Collective Action Tendencies.
B β SE p-value R2
Model 1 Intercept 4.93 0.91 < 0.001 0.07
Social supporta -0.36 -0.11 0.54 0.51
RS 0.00 -0.00 0.07 0.99
Social identity 0.20 .023 0.15 0.18
Model 2 Social supporta  x  RS 0.28 0.78 0.15 0.07 0.16
  aSocial support is a dummy variable coded as 0 if support for own position is low, and 1 otherwise. In model 2, only the 
coefficient of the added interaction variable is shown. Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented. RS = Rejection   
sensitivity.9
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The results show that there is a significant main effect of efficacy in model 1, 
indicating that efficacy is the best single predictor for protest activity. The more an 
individual believes that protest activity is an effective way to bring about social change, 
the more motivated they are to take part in such activities. The interaction in model 2 
from the previous analysis between rejection sensitivity and social support remained 
virtually unchanged when controlling for efficacy, and no other two-way interactions 
were significant in model 2. In the third model we find a significant three-way interaction 
between social support, rejection sensitivity, and efficacy. This interaction is illustrated 
in Figure 2.
When efficacy was low, highly rejection sensitive individuals, compared to those 
with low RS, expressed more intention to participate when they experienced high 
social support. We checked whether individuals who had low social support and low 
sensitivity to rejection expressed high willingness to participate because they believe 
protest activity to be an efficient way of influencing political decisions. The three-way 
interaction reveals that there is a difference within this group (low support, low RS), 
and that those who score high on efficacy are more likely to participate, possibly due to 
the above argument that they feel that their participation is needed for social change, 
while those who score low on efficacy are less motivated to participate. The contrast of 
marginal effects confirms that willingness to participate is significantly higher for those 
that experience low support and low RS but believe protest activity to be an effective way 
to bring about change (see Figure 2).
Interestingly, individuals high in rejection sensitivity, who experience high social 
support, but score low on efficacy are more likely to express willingness to participate, 
while those low in rejection sensitivity, are those least inclined to participate. Thus, 
rejection sensitivity seems to be decisive in predicting who will participate. This suggests 
that highly rejection sensitive individuals participate in an effort to build relations, as 
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Figure 1. Two-way interaction between Rejection Sensitivity and Social Support on Collective Action Tendencies 
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they do not believe the form is efficient for bringing change. When these individuals had 
low social support the trend was reversed; highly rejection sensitive individuals low in 
efficacy expressed less willingness to participate than those low in rejection sensitivity. 
Again, highly rejection sensitive individuals refrain from activity if they feel that this 
may come with a social cost. 
General Discussion and Future Research
Each year, individuals take the streets to demonstrate against issues that may 
contradict their interests. Considering that sometimes the probability of affecting the 
outcome is low, the question that arises is ‘why do people protest’. Drawing on Olson 
(1965), some scholars have described participation essentially as a paradox. That is, 
many people participate in political behavior although the probability of affecting the 
outcome is low. The selective incentives model states that some individuals participate 
because of incentives that can be enjoyed by themselves regardless of the outcome (Bäck 
et al., 2011). Examples of such incentives may be the joy of expressing one’s opinion, the 
feeling of doing one’s duty etc (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968; Pattie et al., 2004; Bäck et al., 
2011). 
A sub-category to the selective incentive is what is known as social incentives. Social 
incentives refers mainly to the social groups to which an individual belong or aspire to 
belong. The social nature of humans may profoundly affect the way they become engaged 
in collective actions. For instance, research show that the extent to which an individual 
identifies with a group matters for how much that individual is willing to invest in that 
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Reicher, 1996, 2001; Simon et al., 1998). As belongingness 
is fundamental to human nature, humans tend to be highly sensitive to, and motivated to 
counter, rejection cues (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). 
Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Social Support, Rejection Sensitivity, Social Identity, 
and Efficacy on Collective Action Tendencies.
B β SE p-value R2
Model 1 Intercept 3.35 0.94 < 0.001 0.30
Social supporta -0.19 -0.06 0.48 0.71
Rejection sensitivity -0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.47
Social identity 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.54
Efficacy 0.38 0.51 0.12 0.00
Model 2 0.38
Supporta x RS 0.27 0.72 0.14 0.07
Efficacy x Supporta 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.94
Efficacy x RS -0.01 -0.12 0.04 0.78
Model 3 0.49
Supporta x RS x Efficacy -0.21 -3.72 0.08 0.02
aSocial support is a dummy variable coded as 0 if support for own position is low, and 1 otherwise. RS = Rejection 
sensitivity. In models 2 and 3, only the coefficients of the added interaction variables are shown. Unstandardized 
regression coefficients are presented.11
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However, individuals vary in how sensitive they are to rejection and thus also how 
they respond to possible rejections (Downey & Feldman, 1996). In the present research 
we tentatively hypothesized that highly rejection sensitive individuals are more motivated 
to seek out opportunities for social interactions such as social protest. In addition, we 
hypothesized that this should be particularly the case when social support for a cause 
is high. That is to say, when individuals expect relevant others to agree with their 
willingness to participate. Results seemed to confim our hypoheses. Highly rejection 
sensitive individuals who perceive high social support are more likely to engage in protest 
activity than less rejection sensitive individuals, or individuals with low social support. 
Interestingly, we also found that low rejection sensitive individuals who had low social 
support tended to be more willing to protest than those who scored high on rejection 
sensitivity (in the low support condition). What is particularly intriguing here is that 
rejection sensitivity seems to affect differently willingness to participate in collective 
actions depending on the level of social support. Thus, when support is high, there is 
a positive relation between rejection sensitivity and collective action tendencies, while 
when support is low, the opposite is true and the relationship between rejection sensitivity 
and collective action is negative. We contend that low rejection sensitive individuals, who 
had low social support may be motivated to participate because of collective incentives, 
feeling that their effort to stop the proposal to implement tuition fees is needed. 
This implies that these individuals should also score high on efficacy and be more 
likely to believe that protesting is an effective way to bring about social change. The idea 
that efficacy matters in collective action has been stressed by many scholars (Lane, 1959; 
Bandura, 1995; 1997; van Zomeren, 2004) and it is further supported by our results. A 
significant three-way interaction revealed that individuals who score low on rejection 
sensitivity and who have low social support tend to participate more if they also score 
high on efficacy. This indicates that these individuals should be more motivated to 
participate in collective actions due to collective incentives - the desire to stop a negative 
social development that will ultimately not only affect themselves but the society as a 
Figure 2. Three-way interaction between social support, rejection sensitivity, and efficacy on collective action 
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whole. 
Interestingly, when social support was high, the effect of rejection sensitivity 
on collective action tendencies was most pronounced among those who scored low on 
efficacy. This result clearly points to the importance of including rejection sensitivity as 
a variable in predicting who will participate to collective actions. Also, it indicates that 
those who participate in collective actions for purely social reasons are most likely to 
engage in participation. 
Thus, the results support our hypothesis and also highlighted the role of efficacy, 
suggesting a complex interplay between various incentives. Some people, it seems, 
participate for collective reasons, for example when there is little support for their 
position, and they are not afraid of rejection. In such cases, the motivation to participate 
in protest activity seems to stem from a desire to bring about social change (or stop an 
unwanted change, like the introduction of tuition fees), and because social support for 
their own position is low, people may feel more obliged to give their contribution to this 
change (or non-change). It should be noted that these results are somewhat speculative, 
and further research is needed to clarify the underlying causal mechanisms.
Others, however, prefer to participate because of social reasons, such as when highly 
rejection sensitive people perceive high social support, leading to increased participation. 
Here, two possible reasons may be considered; first, that these individuals participate 
because they perceive an opportunity to build new social relations, or second, because 
they feel it is their duty and expected of them from other individuals (in their group, or 
the society as a whole). That is, the motivation may be an avoidance motivation stemming 
from a fear of exclusion if one refrains from participation, or it may be an approach 
motivation stemming from the desire to establish social relationships (Gray, 1991). This 
issue should be disentangled in future research.
Theoretical implications
The results from this study make an important contribution to our understanding 
of the mechanisms implied in people’s engagement in protest activity. Even though it 
has been known for a long time that the social dimension is important (see for example 
Klandermans, 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008), this study shows that personality 
dispositions relating to social connections must not be neglected. We show that 
individuals, who are highly sensitive to rejection, are more likely to participate in 
protest activity when social support for their own position is high, that is, when most 
others agree with the individual. This supports our argument that the so called calculus 
of participation (Olson, 1965) should be somewhat modified: social incentives, such as 
expressive incentives and social norms, should influence protest activity under specific 
circumstances, when social support for the individual’s position is high, and when we 
are dealing with a specific type of individual, those who are sensitive to rejection. We 
also show that rejection sensitivity matters for individuals’ participation due to collective 
incentives as well. 
Conclusions
In light of recent waves of protests, understanding what drives people to the streets 
becomes more relevant than ever. Adding to former research on individuals’ incentives to 
participate politically, this study was a first step towards integrating rejection sensitivity 
in explanations of participation in protest activities. Our results point to a complex 13
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interaction between personal characteristics, perceived social support for a political 
cause, and beliefs of the potential success of a specific form of political participation. 
Favourable support for a cause increases the willingness to participate of people who are 
sensitive to rejection. However, those that are less concerned with social rejection are 
mainly influenced by the perception that a political protest activity has the potential to 
change a public policy outcome. 
These results open the door to further inquiry regarding the mechanisms that drive 
individuals’ decisions to participate. We speculated that citizens may feel more obliged 
to participate in a collective action when they perceive others will not defend their own 
position unless they are sensitive to personal rejection from their social context. On their 
part, those concerned with personal rejection may decide to participate to build new 
social relations or just due to social pressure. Since political protest is now one of the main 
actions in citizens’ participatory repertoire in between elections, and as some parts of the 
population are more critical to the traditional channels to participate in representative 
democracy, only further investigation on individuals’ incentives to participate will help 
us understand whose voices are heard in the streets.
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